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GALE & SHAPLEY
 G & S considered the problem of matching 
several students to several colleges, 
according to preferences of each, where 
the colleges each had a specific quota.
 An instance of "instability": there are two 
students α and β who are matched to 
colleges A and B, resp., but β prefers A to B 
and A prefers β to α
 A matching of students to colleges is 
considered "unstable" if there is any instance 
of instability. It is called "stable" otherwise.
 Can we always find a matching that is 
stable?
College Admissions and the 
Stability of Marriage
GALE & SHAPLEY
 Remarkably, stability is always achievable, no 
matter the preferences of students/colleges!
 G & S showed this by actually describing an 
algorithm (GS) that found a specific stable 
matching. 
 To simplify the analysis, they initially changed 
the situation: n students and n colleges, each 
with a quota of 1.
 Like "marriages"!
 "students" = "men", "colleges" = "women"
 We will return to the original question later, but 
this is more fun.
 Here, an "unstable matching" means that 
there is some man α and some woman A that 
prefer each other to their assigned match.




1. What if there is a man and a woman that prefer each other 
best? What must be true in any matching that hopes to achieve 
stability?
2. What if the preference lists for the men and woman are all the 
same?
GS "DEFERRED-ACCEPTANCE" OR 
"PROPOSAL" ALGORITHM
 Men propose to women simultaneously in "rounds."
 In round 1, each man proposes to his top woman.
 Each woman evaluates her proposals (if any), and accepts the best, 
rejecting all others. These women are now "engaged."
 In round 2, each rejected man now proposes (simultaneously) to his 
second choice; his first choice didn't work out.
 Each woman evaluates her proposals, even if currently engaged, 
and accepts the best, breaking an engagement if necessary.
 Rounds continue so long as there are still rejected men left to 
propose, or equivalently until each woman has received a proposal.
 Once each woman is engaged, the mass wedding takes place!
SOME FACTS ABOUT THE GS ALGORITHM 
(AND SOME HOMEWORK)
1. It always terminates, in fact in at most (n-1)( n-1)+1 rounds. Why?
2. What about the average/mean/expected number of rounds?
3. It delivers a stable matching. Why?
4. Clearly, men and women can exchange roles, and the women 
could propose instead. The GS algorithm is "proposer optimal" in 
the sense that the proposing group simultaneously do as good as 
each can in any stable matching. Why?
5. It is "proposee floptimal" in the sense that the group being 




 How can we modify the GS algorithm with quotas for 
colleges that are larger than 1?
OTHER APPLICATIONS TO THE 
"STABILITY OF MARRIAGE"?
 Stable Polygamy (multiple wives/husbands)?
 Stable "Roommates" (same gender)?
 Let's look more closely at this one.
A "STABLE ROOMMATES" PROBLEM
 Suppose there are 4 girls (A, B, C, and D) that need to room 
together in pairs.
 Suppose A ranks B best, B ranks C best, C ranks A best, and all 
three rank D worst. What will happen? Do D's rankings matter?
"THE READER WHO HAS FOLLOWED US THIS FAR HAS DOUBTLESS NOTICED A CERTAIN TREND IN OUR 
DISCUSSION. IN MAKING THE SPECIAL ASSUMPTIONS NEEDED IN ORDER TO ANALYZE OUR PROBLEM 
MATHEMATICALLY, WE NECESSARILY MOVED FURTHER AWAY FROM THE ORIGINAL COLLEGE 
ADMISSION QUESTION, AND EVENTUALLY IN DISCUSSING THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM, WE 
ABANDONED REALITY ALTOGETHER AND ENTERED THE WORLD OF MATHEMATICAL MAKE-BELIEVE. 
THE PRACTICAL-MINDED READER MAY RIGHTFULLY ASK WHETHER ANY CONTRIBUTION HAS BEEN 
MADE TOWARD AN ACTUAL SOLUTION OF THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM. EVEN A ROUGH ANSWER TO 
THIS QUESTION WOULD REQUIRE GOING INTO MATTERS WHICH ARE NONMATHEMATICAL, AND 
SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD BE OUT OF PLACE IN A JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS. IT IS OUR OPINION, 
HOWEVER, THAT SOME OF THE IDEAS INTRODUCED HERE MIGHT USEFULLY BE APPLIED TO CERTAIN 
PHASES OF THE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM."
~~ GALE & SHAPLEY

GALE & SHAPLEY WERE RIGHT!
 Lloyd Shapley had laid the foundation in the abstract realm, 
starting with his joint work with David Gale in the 1950s and 1960s.
 Alvin Roth had realized, starting in the 1980s, that Shapley's 
continued work could be adapted and applied in a broad 
range of practical scenarios, including stable assignments of:
 new doctors to hospitals (residencies, NRMP);
 students to schools (school choice); and
 human organs for transplant to recipients.

PROBABILITY, ANYONE?
 Consider the preference lists to be (uniformly) random, in the n
men n women situation.
 Each collection of preference lists (how many?) is called an 
"instance of the stable marriage problem."
 Let S be the number of stable matchings in the random instance 
of the stable marriage problem.
 Know: Pr(S ≥ 1) = 1.
 What about the expected value of S, E[S]? Can this be 
computed? If so, is E[S] indicative of a likely value for S?
FACTS ABOUT “S”
 Donald Knuth (1976) found an integral formula for E[S].
 Knuth (1978) produced a problem instance that had 2n/2 stable 
matchings.
 Robert Irving and Paul Leather (1986) extended Knuth’s example, 
and algorithmically found problem instances with more than 2n
stable matchings.
 Knuth extended the work of Irving and Leather, and showed that 
their algorithm produced problem instances with at least 2.28n
stable matchings.
 Open Problem: Is Irving-Leather’s problem instance best possible?
FACTS ABOUT “S”
 Meanwhile, in 1972 McVitie and Wilson had found a sequential 
version of the GS algorithm, where men propose one-at-a-time.
 In 1990, Knuth, Motwani and Pittel extended the sequential GS 
algorithm in such a way that it delivered all possible stable husbands 
for any given women, and used this to show that with probability 
tending to 1 the number of those stable husbands is roughly 0.5 ln n.
 Thus, with high probability, S ≥ 0.5 ln n. (!!)
 But later (1992) Boris Pittel showed that, actually, S ≥ (n/ln n)1/2 with 
high probability.
 Can we do better? That is, can we show that S is even larger with 
high probability?
FACTS ABOUT “S”
 Boris Pittel (1986) showed that E[S] ~ e-1n ln n by using Knuth’s 
formula for E[S]. This suggests (but does not prove) that most
instances of the stable marriage problem have lots of stable 
matchings.
 To prove that the (asymptotic) value of E[S] is actually a likely
value, Craig Lennon and Boris Pittel (2008) managed to show that 
E[S2] ~ (e-2 + 0.5e-3)n2 ln2 n.
 The combination of E[S] and E[S2] imply (Cantelli’s inequality) that 
at least 84% of stable marriage problem instances have cn ln n
stable matchings!
WHAT ABOUT “STABLE ROOMMATES”?
 Here, assume that there are n people of the same gender, each 
with their own preference list (having ranked everyone but 
themselves from best-to-worst). How many?
 Each collection of preference lists represents an “instance of the 
stable roommates problem.”
 For a (uniformly) random problem instance, let R be the number 
of stable matchings.
 Know: Pr(R ≥ 1) < 1, in contrast with S.
 A problem instance x is said to be “solvable” if R(x) ≥ 1, so 
Pr(random problem instance x is solvable) = Pr(R ≥ 1).
“R” VERSUS “S” SUMMARY
 cn-1/2 ≤ Pr(R ≥ 1) ≤ e1/2/2 = 0.82436…
 Irving and Pittel
 E[R] ~ e1/2 = 1.64872… (Pittel)
 Conjecture (Mertens, 2005): 
 Pr(R ≥ 1) ~ cn-1/4
 Pr(S ≥ 1) = 1 
 GS algorithm
 E[S] ~ e-1n ln n (Pittel)
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